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EQUAL PROTECTION
SECOND DEPARTMENT
In re Cooper 830
(decided February 1, 1993)
Petitioner, who was the surviving partner of a homosexual
relationship, claimed that his state equal protection rights831 were
violated. 832 Petitioner alleged he was prohibited from exercising
his right of election against the decedent's will as a "surviving
spouse," 833 as set forth in section 5-1.1(c)(1)(B) of the New
York Estates, Powers and Trusts Law (E.P.T.L.). 834 The
Appellate Division, Second Department concluded that the
survivor of a homosexual relationship is not deserving of a right
of election because he is not deemed to be a "surviving
spouse." 835 Consequently, the court held that the petitioner's
constitutional rights had not been violated. 836
The petitioner had lived with his lover, the decedent, in a
spousal-type relationship for approximately four years. 837
830. 187 A.D.2d 128, 592 N.Y.S.2d 797 (2d Dep't 1993).
831. N.Y. CONST. art I, § 11 ("No person shall be denied the equal
protection of the laws of this state or any subdivision thereof .... ").
832. Cooper, 187 A.D.2d at 132, 592 N.Y.S.2d at 799.
833. Id. at 130, 592 N.Y.S.2d at 798.
834. N.Y. EsT. POWERS & TRuSTS LAW § 5-1.1(c)(1)(B) (McKinney 1981
& Supp. 1994) provides in relevant part:
(c) Election by surviving spouse against wills executed and
testamentary provisions made after August thirty-first, nineteen
hundred sixty-six ....
(1) Where, after August thirty-first, nineteen hundred sixty-six, a
testator executes a will disposing of his entire estate, and is
survived by a spouse, a personal right of election is given to
the surviving spouse to take a share of the decedent's estate,
subject to the following:...
(B) The elective share... is one-third of the net estate if
the decedent is survived by one or more issue and, in
all other cases, one-half of such net estate.
Id.
835. Cooper, 187 A.D.2d at 134-35, 592 N.Y.S.2d at 801.
836. Id. at 135, 592 N.Y.S.2d at 801.
837. Id. at 129, 592 N.Y.S.2d at 797.
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Although the petitioner and the decedent were of the same sex,
the petitioner alleged that they assumed the roles of husband and
wife by keeping a home together, maintaining a physical
relationship, sharing expenses, and acknowledging their spousal
relationships to their friends. 838 Moreover, the petitioner claimed
that the two lovers wanted to get married but were denied their
constitutional right to do so because no clerk would issue a
marriage license to them.8.39 When the decedent died, the
petitioner received the residuary of the decedent's estate, whereas
the decedent's former lover received real estate, valued at eighty
percent of the entire estate. 840 Although the petitioner was not
legally married to the decedent, 841 he asserted that he was a
"surviving spouse" as defined in the E.P.T.L. and thus, was
entitled to a right of election against decedent's will. 842
The court found that refusal to permit petitioner a right of
election against his lover's will, as provided in the E.P.T.L., did
not violate his state equal protection rights. 843 In reaching this
conclusion, the court noted that even if the statute had failed to
provide an express definition for the term "'surviving spouse,' an
interpretation of the statute to the same effect would be
warranted." 844 Although the E.P.T.L. defines a "surviving
spouse" to be a husband or wife, 845 the court interpreted the
statute as being read in its most "ordinary and accepted
meaning," and thus, refused to incorporate homosexual partners
into the definition.846 The court relied on the reasoning of the
838. Id. at 129-30, 592 N.Y.S.2d at 797.
839. Id. at 130, 592 N.Y.S.2d at 797-98.
840. Id. at 129, 592 N.Y.S.2d at 797.
841. Petitioner claimed that the court's denial of a right to exercise his




844. Id. at 131, 592 N.Y.S.2d at 798.
845. N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 5-1.2(a) (McKinney 1981 &
Supp. 1994) states that "[a] husband or wife is a surviving spouse within the
meaning, and for the purposes of... 5-1.1 ... ." Id.
846. Cooper, 187 A.D.2d at 131, 592 N.Y.S.2d at 798.
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Minnesota Supreme Court in Baker v. Nelson,847 which rejected
the argument that the lack of an explicit statutory prohibition
against same-sex marriages indicated "a legislative intent to
authorize such marriages." 848 The Baker court further stated that
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is not
"offended by the state's classification of persons authorized to
marry [because] [t]here is no irrational or invidious
discrimination. " 849
Adopting the Baker rationale, the second department refused to
extend the holding in Braschi v. Stahl Associates, Co.,850 which
expanded the traditional definition of a "surviving spouse." 851
Instead, the court relied on their decision in Alison D. v. Virginia
M.,852 which held that a lesbian partner was not considered a
"parent" under the Domestic Relations Law, and that the
application of the Braschi decision would be "totally
misplaced." 853 Therefore, the court concluded that a survivor of
a homosexual relationship is not within the common definition of
a "surviving spouse" under E.P.T.L.854
Petitioner contended that such a narrow reading of the term
"surviving spouse" violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
State Constitution. 855 Petitioner further claimed that this reading
highlighted the state's failure to interpret the Domestic Relations
Law, which prohibits homosexuals and lesbians from obtaining
847. 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971) (defining "marriage as the state of
union between persons of the opposite sex").
848. Id. at 185.
849. Id. at 187.
850. 74 N.Y.2d 201, 543 N.E.2d 49, 544 N.Y.S.2d 784 (1989). In
Braschi, the court held that in the absence of a statutory definition, the term
family, for rent control purposes, included unmarried lifetime partners of
tenants, as well as individuals related by blood or law. Id. at 211, 543 N.E.2d
at 54, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 789 (emphasis added).
851. Cooper, 187 A.D.2d at 132, 592 N.Y.S.2d at 799.
852. 155 A.D.2d 11, 552 N.Y.S.2d 321 (2d Dep't), aft'd, 77 N.Y.2d 651,
569 N.Y.S.2d 586, 572 N.E.2d 27 (1990).
853. Id. at 15, 552 N.Y.S.2d at 324.




et al.: Equal Protection
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2020
TOURO LAW REVIEW
marriage licenses. 856 However, in applying the rational basis
test, 857 the court found that the classification drawn between
allowing heterosexuals to obtain marriage licenses and
prohibiting homosexuals from attaining them, is rationally related
to a legitimate state interest. 858 Accordingly, the institution of
marriage is "'a union of man and woman, uniquely involving the
procreation and, rearing of children within a family .... This
historic institution manifestly is more deeply founded than the
asserted contemporary concept of marriage and societal interests
for which petitioners contend.' 859 Thus, according to the
narrowly tailored interpretation of "surviving spouse," the court
found that the Equal Protection Clause of the State Constitution
was not violated. 860
Similarly, under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, 861 the state's restrictions on who may be permitted
to obtain marriage licenses would be allowed. For example, in
Bowers v. Hardwick,862 the United States Supreme Court applied
the rational basis test, and held that "homosexual activity is not a
fundamental right."' 863 Thus, application of this standard can be
used regarding classifications based on sexual orientation.
In conclusion, according to this court, the equal protection
rights under both the State and Federal Constitutions are not
violated when a surviving partner of a homosexual relationship is
denied the right of election against the decedent's will pursuant to
New York's Estates, Powers and Trusts Law.
856. Id.
857. Id. at 133, 592 N.Y.S.2d at 799-800 (citing City of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985)) ("[Legislation] "is presumed
to be valid and will be sustained if the classification drawn ... is rationally
related to a legitimate state interest . . ").
858. Cooper, 187 A.D.2d at 133, 592 N.Y.S.2d at 800.
859. Id. (quoting Baker, 191 N.W.2d at 186-87 (quoting Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 346 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)).
860. Id. at 134-35, 592 N.Y.S.2d at 800.
861. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("[N]or shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.").
862. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
863. Cooper, 187 A.D.2d at 134, 592 N.Y.S.2d at 800.
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